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RECENT DECISIONS
minority rule. Those following the majority rule are State V. Taylor, 185 Wash.
198, 52 P. (2d) 1252 (1936) ; Fay v. State (Okla. 1937) 71 P. (2d) 768, and State
v. Freudland, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353, 113 A.L.R. 215 (1937). In State v.
Freudland, ibid., two automobiles collided on a public highway resulting in the
death of a mother and her minor child who were passengers in one of the
automobiles. The defendant-driver of the other automobile was charged in two
indictments with murder in the third degree. It was held that the acquittal on
the prosecution for the death of the mother was not a bar to a prosecution for
the death of the child on the ground of double jeopardy. Although there was
but one single act, there were two distinct and separate offenses. Accord:
Hurst v. State, 24 Ala. App. 47, 129 So. 714 (1930); People v. Brannon, 70 Cal.
App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924) ; Slone v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 366, 99 S.W. (2d)
207 (1936), and State v. Dills, 210 N.C. 178, 185 S.E. 677 (1936).
The three automobile cases following the minority rule are State v. Cosgrove,
103 N.J.L. 412, 135 Atl. 871 (1927) ; Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W. (2d)
400 (1929), and State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933). In
State v. Wheelock, ibid., the defendant-driver operated an automobile which col-
lided with another automobile resulting in the death of three persons. It was
held that there was but one offense, and, therefore, the defendant's acquittal
on a charge of manslaughter for the death of one occupant of the other car
was a bar to his subsequent prosecution for the death of another occupant
of the other car. Accord: State v. Hawchins, 102 W.Va. 169, 134 S.E. 740 (1926),
and People v. Barr, 259 N.Y. 104, 181 N.E. 64 (1932).
With the exception of the case Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 571, 52 N.W. 775
(1892), which merely approaches the principal case, there appears to be no
Wisconsin decision on the exact point of law in question. If a case arises, there-
fore, similar in operative facts to the principal case, Wisconsin is free to adopt
either rule. It is probable, however, that Wisconsin would agree with Minne-
sota and Illinois and follow the majority rule.
WILLIAm EDWARD TAAY.
Criminal Law-Robbery-What Constitutes "From the Person" ?-The
defendant and one Rich, both being armed, assaulted Michael A. Mangini
and did "then and there rob, steal and take from the said Mangini, thirty-
two Dollars." They entered the store of the prosecuting witness and sat
down at a table to have some ice cream sodas. Rich arose, walked up to
Mangini, and asked for cigars. While Mangini was getting them, Rich stepped
in behind him and told him to "stick them up." The defendant, at the same time,
went to the cash register and took the thirty-two dollars. He and Rich fled but
were later arrested.
At the trial, after the State had rested, the defendant moved for a directed
verdict, whereupon, at the court's suggestion, the State was permitted to enter
a nolle prosequi. The defendant excepted to the court's failure to rule on the
motion for a direct verdict and permitting the nolle prosequi to be entered.
On appeal, held, exceptions overruled. The information charges an offense
under P. L. 8400 which provides: "A person who assaults another and feloniously
robs, steals and takes from his person money or other property, the subject of
larceny, being armed with a dangerous weapon, with intent if resisted to kill
or maim the person robbed" shall be punished .... The requirement of taking
from the person as used in the statute is satisfied by a taking from the presence,
1938]
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as at common law. A thing is in the presence of a person in respect to robbery,
which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could,
if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession. State v.
Deso (Vt. 1938) 1 A. (2d) 710.
Wisconsin has three distinct criminal statutes which speak of a "stealing
from the person." One provides for the punishment of "any person who shall
commit the crime of larceny by stealing from the person of another." Wis.
Stat. (1937) Sec. 343.15. In the only Wisconsin Supreme Court decision which
attempts to describe what constitutes this crime, it was held that "Larceny from
the person can only be accomplished by the use of some degree of force ...
There may be no actual violence; certainly none is intended. But there will
necessarily be some slight touching of the clothing, person, or belongings
attached to the person of another, which, though intended to be so slight that
it will be unnoticed, is nevertheless a hostile and wrongful touch, and amounts
to legal force." State v. Lewis, 113 Wis. 391, 89 N.W. 143 (1902). It is to be
noted that the court does not define the meaning of the phrase "from the per-
son" in this decision.
The second Wisconsin statute which mentions "stealing from the person"
reads in part as follows: "Any person who shall assault another and shall
feloniously rob, stead or take from his person any money or other property
which may be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous
weapon, or any firearm .. " Wis Stat. (1937) Sec. 340.39. The third statute
which mentions the phrase under discussion states in part: "Any person who
shall, by force and violence or by assault and putting in fear, feloniously rob,
steal and take from the person of another any money or other property which
may be the subject of larceny, such robber not being armed with a dangerous
weapon. . . ." Wis. Stat. (1937) Sec. 340.43. The phrase, as used in these
statutes, has not yet been judicially interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In other jurisdictions, it has been held that "taking from the person of
another" should, under statutes, receive the same construction as at common law.
The words of this phrase, under common law, were not restricted in their
application to those cases in which the property stolen was in actual contact
with the person from whom it was taken, but included within their meaning the
taking, by force or intimidation, from the presence of the person assaulted, of
property which either belonged to him or was under his personal control and
protection. People v. Braveman, 340 Ill. 525, 175 N.E. 55 (1930). Cf. Douglas v.
State, 21 Ala. App. 289, 107 So. 791 (1926). Robbery at common law has been
described as "the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of
goods or money to any value, by violence or putting in fear." Franklin v. Brown,
73 W.Va. 727, 81 S.E. 405 (1915).
To constitute robbery, the property need not be in actual contact with the
person of the one robbed, People v. Kubish, 357 Ill. 531, 182 N.E. 543 (1934) ;
State v. Verret, 174 La. 1059, 142 So. 688 (1932) ; Hill v. State, 145 Ala. 58, 40
So. 654 (1906) ; People v. Stathas, 356 Ill. 313, 190 N.E. 661 (1934) ; but it is
sufficient that the property be taken from the personal protection and control
of the person robbed. Chizum v. State, 203 Ind. 450, 180 N.E. 674 (1932);
Jackson v. State, 114 Ga. 826, 40 S.E. 1001, 88 Am. St. Rep. 60 (1902) ; State v.
McAllister, 65 W.Va. 97, 63 S.E. 758, 131 Am. St. Rep. 955 (1909). It has been
held that the person offended against must either have the manucaption of the
property, or it must at least be in his presence and under his direct physical,
personal control. Thomas v. State, 91 Ala. 34, 9 So. 81 (1891). This case was
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cited with approval in Hill v. State, 145 Ala. 58, 40 So. 654 (1906). See also
Mahoney v. State, 203 Ind. 421, 180 N.E. 580 (1932). In Turner v. State, 1 Ohio
St. 422 (1853), the defendant demanded money of the prosecuting witness and,
as the wife was handing it over to the prosecuting witness, the defendant
snatched it and pocketed it. This was held to be robbery since it is enough
that the property was in the presence and under immediate control, and that
the offended party was laboring under fear, and that the intent to rob was
present. The property need not actually be severed from the person. Cf. Ibeck v.
State, 112 Tex. Cr. 288, 16 S.W. (2d) 232 (1929), where it was held that one
may be robbed of property not taken from his person. In a case where, because
of threats and violence of the defendant, the complaining witness sent for her
jewels, which were delivered through her maid to the defendant, it was held
that this constituted robbery since it is enough if the property is taken from
the complaining witness' control and protection, and that by violence or putting
in fear she was compelled to surrender it. Corn. v. Homer, 235 Mass 526, 127
N.E. 517 (1920).
It will still be robbery if the property should be taken from another room
in the house other than that wherein the force or violence or putting in fear is
used, State v. Calhoun, 72 Iowa 432, 34 N.W. 199 (1887), or from another
building on the property of the complainant, Clemens v. State, 84 Ga. 660, 11 S.E.
505 (1890), since such property is none the less considered to be in the personal
possession of the person robbed.
In People v. Clayton, 89 Cal. App. 405, 264 Pac. 1105 (1928), it was held that
knocking a strong box from under the arm of the victim and seizing it and
running off with it was robbery. Money taken from a money drawer in a bank
and from a bank vault, in the cashier's presence, supports an indictment for
robbery. Wood v. State, 98 Fla. 703, 124 So. 44 (1929). Cf. People v. O'Hara,
332 I1. 436, 163 N.E. 804 (1928), where robbery from a bank attendant was held
to be robbery from the person. The actual ownership may be in some other third
person. Robards v. State, 37 Okla. Cr. 371, 259 Pac. 166 (1927). As against a
wrongdoer, the actual possession or custody of the goods would be sufficient.
People v. Cabassa, 249 Mich. 543, 229 N.W. 442 (1930).
EDMUND R. MiETus.
Evidence-Proof of Present Crime by Evidence of Past Criminal Acts-
In the prosecution of an official of the State Emergency Relief Administra-
tion for forgery of a relief order, the defendant introduced evidence to show
that the order was merely part of a loose but not mala fide practice. To con-
trovert this, the State introduced evidence as to other transactions of the defend-
ant in reference to relief orders. Defense counsel objected to the admission of
evidence of another offense, citing the general rule against such evidence in
criminal prosecutions. On appeal, held, evidence admissible for the purpose of
showing intent. State v. Stuart (Minn. 1938) 281 N.W. 299.
The general rule is that a man accused of one offense may be convicted
only on evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense. Evidence of his
guilt of one or more other offenses unconnected with that for which he is on
trial must be excluded. It is deemed improper to use proof of one crime as
evidence of likelihood that the defendant would commit another. Smith v. State,
195 Wis. 555, 218 N.W. 822 (1929). Neither general bad character nor the com-
mission of other specific disconnected acts, whether criminal or merely wanton,
1938]
